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Neuroethics and the Problem of Other Minds: Implications of Neuroscience for
the Moral Status of Brain-Damaged Patients and Nonhuman Animals
Abstract
Our ethical obligations to another being depend at least in part on that being's capacity for a mental life.
Our usual approach to inferring the mental state of another is to reason by analogy: If another being
behaves as I do in a circumstance that engenders a certain mental state in me, I conclude that it has
engendered the same mental state in him or her. Unfortunately, as philosophers have long noted, this
analogy is fallible because behavior and mental states are only contingently related. If the other person is
acting, for example, we could draw the wrong conclusion about his or her mental state. In this article I
consider another type of analogy that can be drawn between oneself and another to infer the mental state
of the other, substituting brain activity for behavior. According to most current views of the mind–body
problem, mental states and brain states are non-contingently related, and hence inferences drawn with
the new analogy are not susceptible to the alternative interpretations that plague the behavioral analogy.
The implications of this approach are explored in two cases for which behavior is particularly unhelpful as
a guide to mental status: severely brain–damaged patients who are incapable of intentional
communicative behavior, and nonhuman animals whose behavioral repertoires are different from ours
and who lack language.
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Abstract Our ethical obligations to another being
depend at least in part on that being’s capacity for a
mental life. Our usual approach to inferring the
mental state of another is to reason by analogy: If
another being behaves as I do in a circumstance that
engenders a certain mental state in me, I conclude that
it has engendered the same mental state in him or her.
Unfortunately, as philosophers have long noted, this
analogy is fallible because behavior and mental states
are only contingently related. If the other person is
acting, for example, we could draw the wrong
conclusion about his or her mental state. In this
article I consider another type of analogy that can be
drawn between oneself and another to infer the mental
state of the other, substituting brain activity for
behavior. According to most current views of the
mind–body problem, mental states and brain states are
non-contingently related, and hence inferences drawn
with the new analogy are not susceptible to the
alternative interpretations that plague the behavioral
analogy. The implications of this approach are
explored in two cases for which behavior is particularly unhelpful as a guide to mental status: severely
brain–damaged patients who are incapable of inten-
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tional communicative behavior, and nonhuman animals whose behavioral repertoires are different from
ours and who lack language.
Keywords Philosophy of mind . Brain imaging .
Persistent vegetative state . Animal ethics

The Problem of Other Minds
The “problem of other minds” is a central problem in
the philosophy of mind. It refers to the difficulty of
knowing whether someone or something, other than
oneself, has a mind. This general statement of the
problem covers a variety of more specific problems,
which can be distinguished from one another by the
level of skepticism we adopt. In the most skeptical
version the problem concerns the difficulty of
establishing that there are such things as other minds
at all. One could call this the metaphysical problem of
other minds.
If we make the assumption that there are minds
other than our own in the world, then we encounter
the difficulty of determining which entities have
minds, and what those minds are like. This is the
version we encounter when we ask “How do I know
my philosophy professor is not a robot or a mindless
zombie?” A less skeptical version of this question
grants a mental life resembling one’s own to other
humans, but notes the difficulty of determining the
nature of mental life in other species [32]. These are

M.J. Farah

variants of what could be called the epistemological
problem of other minds, in that they concern the
difficulty of inferring the existence or nature of a
mind from observable evidence. The present article
concerns the epistemological problem of other minds.
Of course, even the epistemological problem depends
heavily on metaphysical assumptions about mind–
body relations; the relevance of physical evidence to
inferences about mental phenomena depends on one’s
view of the relations between the physical and the
mental, in ways to which I will return later.
What is the relevance of the problem of other minds
to neuroethics? Its relevance to ethics rests on the
relation between moral standing and capacity for mental
life, particularly the capacity to suffer. If a being is
capable of suffering, then it deserves protection from
suffering. How and whether we can know about the
mental lives of others is therefore an epistemological
question with direct relevance to ethics. The relevance
of this question to neuroscience rests on the potential
value of neuroscience evidence for informing us about a
being’s mental life. In this article I will argue that,
within the context of a certain class of metaphysical
assumptions concerning mind–brain relations, neuroscience evidence is different from the kinds of evidence
traditionally used to infer mental life, and that it is in
principle more informative.

From Behavior to Mental States: The Argument
from Analogy
The problem of other minds is a consequence of
mind–body dualism, specifically the idea that there is
no necessary relation between physical bodies and
their behavior, on the one hand, and mental processes,
on the other. Descartes’ famous “I think therefore I
am” expresses a basis for certainty concerning the
existence of our own mental life. But on what basis
can we infer that other people have minds? Descartes
invoked the benevolence of God as a reason to trust
our inferences regarding other minds. Why would God
have given us such a clear and distinct apprehension of
other minds if they did not exist [13]?
Non-theological attempts to justify our belief that
other people have minds have generally rested on a
kind of analogy, also discussed by Descartes and
emphasized by Locke [26] and other British empiricists such as J.S. Mill [29]. The analogy uses the

known relation between physical and mental events in
oneself to infer the mental events that accompany the
observable physical events for someone else. For
example, as shown in Fig. 1, when I stub my toe, this
causes me to feel pain, which in turn causes me to say
“ouch!” When I see Joe stub his toe and say “ouch,” I
infer by analogy that he feels pain.
The problem with this analogy is that it begs the
question. Why should I assume that same behavioral–
mental relations that hold in my case also hold in Joe’s?
Joe could be acting and not really feel pain. He could
even be a robot without thoughts or sensations at all.
The assumption that analogous behavior–mental state
relations hold for other people is essentially what the
analogy is supposed to help us infer.
The question of whether someone us actually in
pain or is acting or a robot might seem academic.
After all, common sense tells us that there are no
robots human-like enough to fool us, and barring very
special circumstances there is little reason to suspect
anyone of acting. However, there are two cases in
which the problem is not purely academic. That is,
even with a commonsensical suspension of skepticism concerning robots, actors and the like, in these
cases behavioral inferences to mental state seem
fraught with uncertainty. In this regard, these cases
present us with pragmatic, real-world versions of the
problem of other minds. The first such case is humans
who have sustained severe brain damage and emerge
from coma into a state of wakefulness with little or no
behavioral responsiveness to their environment and
therefore no ability to communicate behaviorally. The
second such case is nonhuman animals whose
behavioral repertoires are different from ours and
who lack language.

Cognition and Behavior after Severe Brain
Damage
Emergence from coma following severe brain damage
typically conforms to a pattern whereby arousal
You stub your toe

→ You feel pain

→ You say "ouch!"

Joe stubs his toe

→ Joe feels pain

→ Joe says "ouch!"

Fig. 1 Example of the use of analogy to infer another
individual’s mental state (italicized) from observable evidence
and one’s own mental state
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systems begin to recover first, leading to periods of
eyes-open wakefulness, followed in some cases by
recovery or awareness, which may be partial and
fluctuating or complete [35]. The sequence of possible
states through which patients may pass after severe
brain damage is illustrated in Fig. 2. The characteristics of these states are summarized in Table 1.
Patients who are arousable but apparently noncognitive are termed “vegetative.” They show a striking
dissociation between behaviors indicating arousal and
awareness. In addition to opening their eyes, vegetative patients may move their trunks and limbs
spontaneously, and have been observed to smile, shed
tears, and vocalize with grunts. They may even orient
their eyes and heads toward peripheral visual motion
or sounds. Yet they do not respond to language or,
with the exception of the reflexive orienting responses
just mentioned, to other aspects of the environment.
In such cases the problem of other minds weighs
heavily on friends and families, who wonder if their
loved one is merely incapable of communicating or is
truly gone. The bitter dispute that divided Terri
Schiavo’s family exemplified this uncertainty. Her
parents saw, in their daughter’s behaviors, the
presence of a mind that recognized loved ones,
enjoyed music, and wanted to live. They attempted
to support their view with videotapes of Terri’s
shifting eye gaze, facial expressions and other simple
but potentially telling behaviors. Her husband, and
most of the medical professionals consulted about the
case, interpreted the behaviors as the reflexive actions
of an unaware being.

Coma

Table 1 Characteristics of possible states through which
patients may pass after severe brain damage
Diagnosis

Arousal

Cognition

Coma
Vegetative
Minimally Conscious
Locked In

Absent
Present
Present
Present

Absent
Absent
Minimal and fluctuating
Present

The possibility of mental life in such patients has
many societal implications beyond the question of
continuing or withdrawing life support, which divided
Schiavo’s family. For example, institutions typically
provide purely custodial care, in which patients’
bodily functions are sustained without any attention
to their experience. To treat a conscious human being
as an insensate object for years on end would clearly
be inhumane. Additionally, the omission of analgesia
for pain, which may be common with vegetative
patients [38], would be unconscionable.
The criterial role of mental life for the diagnosis of
the vegetative state, as well as the ambiguity of
behavioral evidence for inferring mental life, is
expressed in the most recent definitive statement on
this condition, by the Multisociety Task Force on
Persistent Vegetative State [31]. They define it as
“a clinical condition of complete unawareness of
the self and the environment, accompanied by
sleep–wake cycles, with either complete or
partial preservation of hypothalamic and brainstem autonomic functions (p. 1499)... By definition, patients in a persistent vegetative state are
unaware of themselves of their environment.
They are noncognitive, nonsentient, and incapable of conscious experience” (p. 1501).
They go on to acknowledge that

Locked In State

Vegetative State

Permanent
Vegetative State

Brain Death

Minimally
Conscious State

Recovery

Fig. 2 Sequence of possible states through which patients may
pass after severe brain damage

“a false positive diagnosis of a persistent
vegetative state could occur if it was concluded
that a person lacked awareness when, in fact, he
or she was aware. Such an error might occur if a
patient in a locked-in state (i.e. conscious yet
unable to communicate because of severe paralysis) was wrongly judged to be unaware. Thus it
is theoretically possible that a patient who
appears to be in a persistent vegetative state
retains awareness but shows no evidence of it...
In the practice of neurology, this possibility is
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sufficiently rare that it does not interfere with a
clinical diagnosis carefully established by
experts” (p. 1501).
Without minimizing the wisdom or sincerity of the
authors of these words, it must be pointed out that the
problem they note here is a problem precisely because
we have no agreed upon way of determining whether
such false positives are rare.
The diagnostic category of “minimally conscious
state” (MCS) was introduced in 1992 for patients who
display a limited and possibly intermittent form of
responsiveness or communication [15]. Indicative
behaviors include the ability to follow simple commands (e.g. “blink your eyes”), to respond to yes/no
questions verbally or by gesture, any form of
intelligible verbalization, or any purposeful behaviors
that are contingent upon and relevant to the external
environment.
The differential diagnosis of PVS and MCS is
acknowledged to be difficult, particularly given the
fluctuating nature of cognition in MCS. Even after
several examinations, the likelihood of having missed
a patient’s intermittent and unpredictable periods of
sentience may be substantial. It is therefore not
surprising that a review of patients from one hospital
found almost half of the diagnoses of PVS were
wrong because the patients did manifest behavioral
evidence of cognitive ability consistent with MCS [3].
Of course, these false positive PVS diagnoses were
not the result of the independence of mental states and
behavior, such that awareness can exist even without
indicative behavior. Rather, they were simply the
result of insufficient sampling of patients’ behavior.
In contrast, there would appear to be patients for
whom cognition and behavior are truly dissociated. It
seems likely that, as patients evolve out of vegetative
states toward minimally conscious states, even if they do
not cross the boundary by manifesting behavioral
indications of cognition, some will have periods of
mental activity (see [33], discussed later). There is an
analogous lag between the acquisition of cognitive
abilities and the ability to manifest them behaviorally
in infant development. This is attributable to the greater
demands placed on the quality of internal representations used to drive external behaviors compared to the
demands of purely internal processing [30].
In addition, there is a separate diagnostic category
of neurological patients for whom cognition and

behavior are truly dissociated. These individuals
continue to experience full awareness of themselves
and their surroundings while being unable to indicate
their awareness behaviorally. Patients in this condition
are said to be “locked in,” a depressingly apt phrase
that describes near complete or complete paralysis,
the result of interruption of outgoing (efferent) motor
connections, most often by stroke. Patients typically
emerge from coma to find themselves treated as
vegetative, and may try for months or even years to
signal their awareness to medical staff and family
members [22]. In its most classic form, a degree of
preserved voluntary eye movement allows communication, for example answering questions with an
upward gaze for “yes” or spelling words by selecting
one letter at a time with eye movements. For other
patients, the de-efferentation is more complete and no
voluntary behavior is possible [5].

Brain Activity in Severely Brain-Damaged Patients
For neurologists examining patients, as for philosophers pondering the problem of other minds, behavior
is the most obvious and natural type of evidence to
consult for the purpose of inferring the mental life of
another being. Yet behavior is clearly inadequate in
principle, because it is only contingently related to
cognition. Furthermore, certain kinds if brain damage
are known to be capable of changing the cognition–
behavior relation.
In recent years a different type of evidence has
been brought to bear on the study of mental
processes, namely functional neuroimaging [36].
These methods have enabled neuroscientists to test
hypotheses about cognition in normal [2] and braindamaged subjects [37]. One of the most exciting
applications of this approach has been the assessment
of brain activity and brain responses in behaviorally
nonresponsive and minimally responsive patients.
Laureys, Owen and Schiff [19] reviewed the
literature on brain function after severe brain damage.
They report that studies of global brain metabolism at
rest show that the brains of locked in patients are
almost as active as those of healthy and awake
individuals, while the activity measured in comatose,
vegetative and minimally conscious patients’ brains is
more like that of a sleeping or anesthetized person. Of
course, global brain activity is less informative about
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mental processes than is activity in specific brain
regions associated with cognition, and activity at rest
is less informative than activity measured in response
to specific meaningful stimuli. Fortunately there is a
growing body of literature on these more specific
mind-brain correlations.
The specific brain areas associated with awareness
of self and environment include the prefrontal and
medial parietal cortices. This association is based on
measurements of activity in these areas in the normal
conscious state and across a variety of states in which
conscious awareness is diminished, including general
anesthesia, sleep and absence seizures. When resting
medial parietal activity is compared across the
diagnostic categories discussed here, it is highest for
normal control subjects, next highest in locked in
patients, lower in minimally conscious patients, and
lowest in vegetative patients.
Brain responses to meaningful stimulation can be
surprisingly preserved in minimally conscious
patients. For example, in a well-known study by
Schiff and colleagues [40], subjects underwent fMRI
scans while being presented with recordings of a
relative telling a personally relevant story and with
the same recording played backwards, to approximately control for the auditory characteristics of the
stimulus input while varying its meaningfulness. Like
the normal control subjects, the subjects in MCS
activated a network of language-related areas in
response to the meaningful recordings relative to the
backwards recordings. The authors concluded that
“some MCS patients may retain widely distributed
cortical systems with potential for cognitive and
sensory function despite their inability to follow
simple instructions or communicate reliably” (p. 514).
In contrast, imaging studies of vegetative patients
have yielded little evidence of the kinds of neural
processing associated with mental life. In the largest
study of its kind, 15 carefully evaluated patients
meeting criteria for persistent vegetative state were
subjected to painful stimulation while being scanned,
and like normal subjects showed activation of
midbrain, thalamic, and primary sensory cortical
areas. Unlike normal subjects, however, higher
cortical areas normally involved in responding to
painful stimuli, such as the anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC) were not activated [21].
Single case studies of vegetative patients have
occasionally shown preserved brain responses to

meaningful stimuli, although few of the cases
were unambiguously vegetative at the time of
imaging. For example, a patient whose face
recognition system responded to photographs of
faces [28] was described as either “upper boundary
vegetative state or lower boundary minimally conscious state” [19]. The most striking finding to date
in this literature comes from a study by Owen and
colleagues [33] of a vegetative patient who later
recovered, but while meeting diagnostic criteria for
the vegetative state showed patterns of brain
activation indicative of language comprehension
and voluntary mental imagery.
One indication of preserved cognition in this
patient was her increased brain activity when presented with sentences containing ambiguous words, in
the same region as for normal subjects, consistent
with the additional cognitive processing required for
resolving the ambiguity of such sentences. In addition, when instructed to perform mental imagery
tasks, her brain activity indicated that she understood
the instructions and was able to comply. When asked
to imagine playing tennis she activated parts of the
motor system and when asked to imagine visiting
each of the rooms of her home she activated parts of
the brain’s spatial navigation system. Furthermore,
her patterns of brain activation were indistinguishable
from normal subjects’.
In sum, functional neuroimaging provides a new
window on the mental status of severely braindamaged patients. Although there are still relatively
few imaging studies on well-characterized patients, it
is clear that at least some patients with little or no
capacity for purposeful behavior nevertheless show
patterns of brain activation consistent with cognition.

Behavior and Brain Activity as Evidence of Mental
Life
Why is brain imaging able to provide evidence of
mental life when behavior cannot? Is brain activity
simply a more sensitive measure of cognitive processing than behavior, but otherwise plays the same
role in inferences regarding mental life? Or is it
qualitatively different from behavior? Consider the
possibility that brain activity and behavior play
analogous roles. Figure 3 illustrates this possibility,
by replacing the “ouch” behavior of Fig. 1 with
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You stub your toe

→ You feel pain

→ Your ACC activates

Joe stubs his toe
→ Joe feels pain → Joe 's ACC activates
Fig. 3 Example of the use of brain activity to fill the role
played by behavior in Fig. 1

activation of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), part
of the brain’s pain network.
The problem with the argument from analogy in
Fig. 3 is that it implies that feeling pain causes ACC
activation, just as it causes saying “ouch.” However,
the relations between mental states and behaviors are
different in kind from the relations between mental
states and brain states. Mental states and behaviors are
contingently related. What one means by a term like
“feeling pain” is not a behavior, or even a behavioral
disposition. Although this possibility was explored in
earnest by some behaviorist philosophers several
decades ago, for example by Ryle [39], it is not now
regarded as a viable approach to the meaning of
mental state terms.
For purposes of knowing mental states, behavior is
like an indicator light. Indicator lights can be disabled
or disconnected, or they can be turned on by other
means. Their relation to the thing indicated is
contingent on being hooked up a certain way.
Inferences based on indicator lights and, analogously,
behavior are therefore fallible. In contrast, virtually all
contemporary approaches to the mind–body problem
regard the relation between mental states and brain
states as noncontingent.
The predominant view of the relation between
mental states and brain states in cognitive neuroscience and contemporary philosophy of mind is one of
identity: mental states are brain states. According to
one version of this view, “type identity,” each type of
mental event is a type of physical event [8, 45].
According to a weaker version, “token identity,”
every instance of a mental event is an instance of a
physical event. The most widely accepted version of
token identity is based on “functionalism,” which
identifies the functional role of a physical state, in
mediating between the inputs and outputs of the
organism, as the determinant of its corresponding
mental state [7]. Functionalism has many versions of
its own, some of which blur the line between type and
token mind–brain identity theory (e.g., [4, 24]).
There is an alternative to mind–brain identity based
on the idea that mental states “supervene” on brain
states, which avoids substance dualism yet stops short

of equating mental states with brain states [9, 17].
Figure 3 is incompatible with supervenience theories
as well as identity theories. This is because, despite
the nonidentity of mental and brain states according to
supervenience theories, the relation between with the
two is stronger than mere causality. According to
supervenience, mind–brain relations are noncontingent. In the words of Davidson, “there cannot be two
events alike in all physical respects but differing in
some mental respects [and] an object cannot alter in
some mental respects without altering in some
physical respects” (p 214).
In sum, across all these different contemporary
metaphysical positions on the mind–body problem,
the relationship between mental states and brain states
is not contingent, as with the causal relations
diagrammed in Fig. 1. For type identity theories as
well as functionalist theories, the ACC activation of
the example is identical to a pain. For supervenience
theories, the ACC activation cannot exist without
there being pain. Thus it makes more sense to
diagram the inferences from brain activity to mental
state as in Fig. 4. The gist of this figure is that,
however sure you are of the ACC activation in Joe’s
brain, you can be that sure that Joe is in pain. In sum,
the argument from analogy with brain activity is
immune to the alternative interpretations that plague
the behavioral analogy.

The Problem of Other, Nonhuman, Minds
Like the severely brain-damaged humans just discussed, nonhuman animals have limited communicative abilities, and this limitation deprives us of the
usual methods for learning about their mental states
[1, 11]. Although few people today would agree with
Descartes’ conclusion that animals lack mental states
altogether, most of us feel uncertain about the extent
and nature of animals’ mental lives. On the one hand,
You feel pain
You stub your toe

→
Your ACC activates
Joe feel pain

Joe stubs his toe

→

,
Joe s ACC activates

Fig. 4 Example of the use of brain activity to infer mental state
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many of us anthropomorphize certain animals, especially our pets, attributing complex thoughts and
expectations to them on the basis of what a human
in the same situation might think. On the other hand,
the mental life of animals is often treated by us as
hypothetical, incomparably different from our own, or
even nonexistent. How else to explain our acceptance
of glue traps for rodents and boiled lobster dinners?
As illustrated in Fig. 5, nonhuman animals present
us with a version of the problem of other minds for
which the usual problematic analogy is even more
problematic because of differences between human
and animal behavioral repertoires. Animals cannot
talk, and may not even express distress in nonverbal
ways that are analogous to ours. For example, they
may not vocalize at all, and may freeze rather than
struggle when afraid.
Can the neuroscience approach provide traction for
exploring the mental life of other species? To a degree
it already has, yet according to the present analysis it
could provide even more. Ethicists have previously
brought physiological data to bear on the question of
animal suffering, specifically the similarities between
human and animal pain systems. For example, Singer
([42] pp. 12–13) quotes at length from the writings of
a pain researcher to the effect that pain processing is a
lower level brain function which differs little between
humans and other animals. This use of physiological
data differs in two ways from the present one.
First, according to the present analysis, physiological data are not simply one more source of evidence
about a being’s mental life, to be weighed together
with behavioral evidence, valuable as they might be
in that role. Rather, physiological data can play a
qualitatively different and more definitive role because of their noncontingent relation to mental states,
as argued in the last section. In terms of the inferences
diagrammed earlier, this is the difference between
Figs. 3 and 4.
The second difference results from the relatively new
ability of cognitive neuroscience to parse brain processes into psychologically and ethically meaningful

You stub your toe

→ You feel pain

→ You say "ouch!"

Bat stubs his toe
→ Bat feels pain
→ Bat squeeks
Fig. 5 An illustration that nonhuman animals present a version
of the problem of other minds

categories. In the present case, it has revealed the neural
basis of the distinction between what could be called
“mere pain” and suffering. Pains vary along many
dimensions, and one dimension of particular ethical
relevance is the psychological quality of the pain [10,
12, 16]. Some pain experiences are primarily physical
while others are psychologically distressing. The latter,
characterized by Dawkins as both unpleasant and
intense, warrant the term “suffering.” The neural states
corresponding to pain states appear to respect this
important distinction, demarcating the physical and
psychological components of pain experience by the
involvement of different brain areas.
Research with animals and humans has revealed a
widespread network of brain areas that become active
in response to pain-inducing stimuli, including thalamic and somatosensory cortical regions as well as
regions further removed from the sensory input such
as the insula and anterior cingulate cortex. When the
physical intensity of pain is varied, for example in an
imaging experiment by having human subjects touch
a painfully hot surface that varies in temperature, the
level of activity throughout this network varies [6].
Taking advantage of the human ability to report their
mental states (and in principle the possibility of first
person research in which one introspects on one’s
own mental states), it is possible to vary independently the physical and psychological dimensions of
pain and map the brain states that correspond to each.
Morphine, for example, is known to diminish the
psychological component of pain. Patients commonly
report that they still feel the “physical” pain but that
they are less bothered by it. The same is reported by
patients whose pain is treated with hypnotic suggestion. Both interventions have their neural effects
primarily in the ACC [18, 25, 34]. When people
who are not being subjected to pain are empathizing
intensely with someone who is, their ACCs become
activated in the absence of physical pain [44]. These
findings indicate that ACC activation reflects suffering rather than “mere” pain.
Shriver [41] points out that mammals have ACCs
and are thus neurally equipped for psychological as
well as physical pain. Following Shriver we can
substitute an animal for Joe in Fig. 4. However,
because brain states can only be as similar as the
brains that have them, we must amend the diagram as
shown in Fig. 6 to specify a human ACC is one’s
own case and an animal ACC in the animal’s.
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You feel pain
You stub your toe

→
Your ACC activates
Bat feels pain

Bat stubs his toe

→

,
Bat s bat ACC activates
Fig. 6 Example of the use brain activity to infer mental state in
a different species

This raises the question of how could one
determine whether mind–brain relations established
with one species’ brain generalize to other species.
Behind this question is a more fundamental one about
how degrees and types of variation in brain states
correspond to degrees and types of variation in mental
states, a question that will arise even within a given
species because no two brains are identical. In
principle, one could manipulate human brains (including one’s own) to systematically vary all the
different biophysical characteristics by which brains
differ, in order to discover what the relevant aspects
of the brain state are for determining the mental state.
Of course in practice this is not even remotely possible.
At best we can suppose that similarity of psychological state will fall off as similarity of brain state
falls off, without knowing which aspects of brain state
similarity are relevant or how sharply the one falls off
relative to the other. Edelman, Baars and Seth [14]
provide an example of the attempt to identify
functional similarities in brain architecture across
species, including nonmammalian species. Shriver
[41] attempts to address the problem of generalization
from human to nonhuman in the case of pain by citing
evidence that the ACC plays a similar role in rat and
human pain experience (although this evidence is
admittedly based on behavior, which the present
appeal to brain evidence was intended to replace):
LaGraize and colleagues [20] compared the behavior
of rats with and without lesions of the ACC when
forced to choose between staying in the dark, which
rats generally prefer, and avoiding electric shocks to
their feet. All of the rats reacted similarly when
shocked, by withdrawing the shocked foot, thus
indicating preserved perception of pain. However,
the lesioned rats were more willing to experience the
shocks for the sake of staying in a dark region of the
experimental apparatus. Like patients on morphine,
they appeared to be less distressed by the pain. This

implies that rat ACCs play a role similar to human
ACCs.
Am I suggesting that neuroscience can tell us what
it is like to be a bat? Yes and no. When Nagel [32]
framed this question, he chose the bat as his
nonhuman animal because bats use echolocation to
perceive the world, a sense which humans lack.
Knowing what is it like to perceive the world with a
sense we lack remains a problem, even with the help
of neuroscience, because the neural systems that
perform echolocation in bats have no obvious
homolog in the human brain. However, given that
we do share the same general pain physiology with
bats, including an ACC, we can know certain things
about what it’s like to be one of them. Specifically, we
can infer that to be a bat with an injured toe is more
like being a human with an injured toe and no pain
relief than it is like being a human with an injured toe
who has been given morphine.
The problem of animal minds has not thus far
figured prominently in the field of neuroethics. One
reason may be that neuroethics is young and has yet
to engage all of the subject matter that will eventually
comprise the field. Another reason may be that the
personal and political rancor associated with animal
ethics has discouraged scholars from approaching this
topic. Given the real-world importance of animal
ethics, and the special role that neuroscience evidence
can play in this endeavor, the study of animal
neuroethics would seem to hold great promise.

Assumptions and Conclusions
The idea that neuroscience can reveal ethically
relevant information about severely brain-damaged
patients and nonhuman animals rests on a number of
assumptions. One assumption that has not been
examined in this article is that our ethical obligations
toward a being depend at least in part on the mental
life of that being. Although this assumption hardly
needs defending, there is much more that could be
said about which specific aspects of mental life have
which specific ethical implications. Perhaps the most
important further clarification concerns those aspects
of mental life that obligate us to prevent suffering,
and those that obligate us to protect life.
The present article has focused on the question of
whether another being has the capacity for relatively
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simple mental states, those with some consciously
experienced content and affective valence. This
mental capacity has more limited ethical implications
than the mental capacity to conceive of oneself and
one’s life and have an explicit preference to continue
living [23, 43]. The neuroscience evidence discussed
so far pertains only to the capacity of patients and
animals to experience the former kind of mental state,
and the relevant ethical implications are therefore
confined to preventing suffering rather than protecting
life. However, this is not an in-principle limitation of
neuroscience data. Given the appropriate research
program, there is no reason why we could not identify
the neural systems, and states thereof, corresponding
to the self-concept and the desire to continue living.
This knowledge would have implications for many
aspects of end-of-life decision making, and might
even obligate us to refrain from killing certain
animals.
Another assumption that deserves explicit discussion concerns the relation between cognitive processing, of the kind that cognitive neuroscientists correlate
with brain activation in imaging experiments, and
consciousness. This is an important assumption in the
present context because our ethical concern is with
conscious mental life, and conscious suffering in
particular, rather than with unconscious information
processing. Based on most of the views of mind–brain
relations reviewed earlier, certain types or instances of
neural processing are identical to, or are necessarily
associated with, certain mental states, including
conscious mental states. Therefore the problem is
one of determining empirically which brain states
correspond to which conscious mental states. This is
not a trivial problem, but it is in principle solvable.
Indeed, if one is willing to accept other normal
humans’ reports of conscious experience as evidence,
we are on our way to solving it in practice. (Skeptics
unwilling to accept others’ reports of conscious
experience would have to be scanned themselves,
which could be done to verify specific findings but
not be feasible as a means of verifying all cognitive
neuroscience knowledge.)
A final assumption concerns the accuracy and
completeness of cognitive neuroscience. For purposes
of exploring the in-principle prospects and limitations
of neuroscience evidence as a solution to the
problem of other minds, I have written as if we know
the brain states associated with specific mental states.

Unfortunately, this is not true. Although cognitive
neuroscience has made tremendous progress in the
last few decades, the current state of our knowledge is
far from complete. For many mental states, including
suffering, we have good working hypotheses about
the brain regions that are relevant, but future research
will undoubtedly call for the revision of some of these
hypotheses. In addition, we know little about the
specific mechanisms by which these regions implement the relevant mental states. “Activation” observed in brain imaging studies is closely related to
neural activity measured at the single cell level, but
does not map perfectly onto a specific aspect of
neuronal behavior such as action potentials [27].
Furthermore, any single measure of brain activity, be
it single cell or aggregate, electrical or chemical, will
omit potentially important features of neuronal function. It is possible that activation as measured by our
current methods is not diagnostic of the relevant
neuronal activity and that under some circumstances it
will be misleading. Knowing more about the specific
computations performed by neurons in the brain
regions implicated by brain imaging, including their
interactions with neurons in other regions, will be
particularly important as we attempt to evaluate crossspecies homologies.
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